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Price Adjustments in Cherry Markets
R. Thomas Schotzko  and Wesley  W. Wilson
Buyers of cherries trade initially without inspection.  Upon receipt, buyers sometimes
seek to renegotiate the earlier agreements.  Empirical results suggest that changing mar-
ket conditions, fruit quality, and characteristics of the trading partners significantly  affect
the probability that a trade is renegotiated.
Sale  and  delivery  of  a  highly  perishable  In the markets  we analyze, there  is a history
product,  such  as  sweet  cherries,  is  fraught  with  of buyers occasionally using quality levels  to  ex-
risk due to quality and price uncertainty.  Quality  tract price adjustments from shippers.  The cherry
of cherries is driven by weather conditions during  industry in Washington responded to these activi-
the growing season as well as by handling during  ties, first by having  representatives  in the market
the  harvest  and  shipment  periods.  Buyers  of  to observe  the fruit  as it arrived and then to pro-
cherries  purchase  without inspection  and without  vide information to the shipper when the receiver
perfect  knowledge  of market conditions that will  attempted  to renegotiate price  on the basis  of un-
exist when  they  ultimately  receive  the  cherries.'  acceptable  quality.  As the  representatives  accu-
Further,  because  of transit  times  there  is  a  lag  mulated  information  (informally)  on  the  quality
from  initial  sale  to  receipt  of the  product,  and  of fruit on arrival,  it became  obvious that  quality
during  that  lag  prices  can  change  dramatically  and price  renegotiations  were  problematic.  As a
(Tucker).  Thus, at the time of initial sales, buyers  result, over the past several years the industry has
and sellers have neither symmetric nor perfect in-  been collecting  data on fruit  quality at  receiving
formation.  Upon receipt  of the  cherries,  buyers  point.  The ultimate  purpose of this  activity  is to
realize the quality and  price risk.  After realiza-  determine  which types  of defects  were  the  most
tion, they can and often do  attempt to renegotiate  common.  Given  this  information,  presumably,
the initial terms of trade.  The  purpose of our re-  efforts  could  be  made  to  overcome  the  quality
search  is to examine  the determinants  of renego-  problems.
tiation  by buyers.  We  develop  and  estimate  a  The availability of these data allow an oppor-
model of renegotiation of initial terms of trade  as  tunity to  evaluate  the determinants  of renegotia-
a  function  of shipper  and  buyer  characteristics,  tion.  Indeed,  these data allow the  effects of qual-
quality  levels,  and  changes  in  the  market  price  ity  (overall  and of specific  quality  attributes)  as
between  the initial trade  and receipt  of the cher-  well  as the  effects of price changes  on the prob-
ries.  ability of renegotiation to be identified.
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search  assistance  from  Melissa Harwood-Rom  and  editorial  fui  fruit has  a  greater  potential  to  be  below  market comments from David Hunger.
standards  on  arrival.  Under  these  conditions  it Rosenman and Wilson (1991)  examine cherry  prices in this  standards  on  arrival.  Under  these  conditions  it
market where trades  are made with  asymmetric  information.  seems  reasonable  to  expect  that  some  receivers
Their results suggest  that  sellers  practices  can  signal  asym-  may be more likely to attempt to renegotiate price
metric quality  levels within  the same  grade.  They find that  after the fruit arrives.  At the same time there  are
Akerlofs  (1970)  lemon's  problem  does  not  obtain  in  this  some  shippers  who  tend  to  focus  on  the  price
market  because  of a  Spence  (1983)  type  signaling  mecha-
nism.  For  related  studies  see  Allen  (1984),  Bond  (1982),  market  as  opposed  to  the  quality  market)  and
Faulhaber (1989), and Gal-Or (1989).  consequently ship a lower quality product.  Ship-48  September 1995  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
pers who commonly serve  the price conscious  re-  renegotiate  prices.  There  are  variety  of factors
ceiver  ship  a greater  volume  of fruit  nearer  the  including  supply,  demand,  quality,  behavioral,
minimum-grade  standards,  and  therefore,  have  a  and  interpersonal  ones  that  may  influence  both
higher probability  of having  fruit arrive  with be-  the decision to ask for a price adjustment  and the
low minimum-grade standards.  magnitude of the price adjustment (Waugh).
In  evaluating  these  quality,  price,  and  ship-  The  seller must agree to a price adjustment.
per/buyer  characteristics,  we  first  describe  the  However,  the seller's  position is  now considera-
price negotiation process in the next section.  We  bly weaker than it was at the time  of initial sale.
then  describe  our  empirical  application  to  the  The seller has three options-that  may be pursued.
cherry market and summarize our results.  The first is to accept a lower price.  The second is
to ship the fruit to another  buyer (most  likely on
Price Negotiation  in Cherry Markets  consignment)  who  usually  repackages  the  fruit
and  remits to the shipper  only the residual  reve-
At  the  time  of  initial  sale,  the  buyer  and  nue  after  covering  repackaging  costs.  The third
seller  negotiate  price  and  terms  of  trade  with  option is to dispose of the load at a waste disposal
asymmetric information.  The seller  brings infor-  site.  The second and third options  seldom gener-
mation regarding industry volume, a perception of  ate returns to the  seller that match the returns as-
demand,  past  shipment  history,  knowledge  of  sociated  with  renegotiation.  In  short,  the  seller,
other price offers, and quality of the product to be  no  longer  having  direct  information  on  quality
shipped.  The buyer brings  information  regarding  and  having  limited  alternatives  to  renegotiation,
other price offerings, product movement  at retail,  may agree to  a price adjustment  because  of trust
historical price patterns,  current season price pat-  in  the  integrity  of the buyer  and  because  of the
terns, and expected volumes.  While the informa-  desire to make  sales to this  buyer at  a later date
tion  base of buyer  and  seller overlap,  the  quality  (O'Rourke).
of the information is not symmetric.
At the time of initial sale, the seller generally  Empirical Framework
has  a price  floor  beneath  which  positive returns
are not earned.  Packing costs generally determine  In  a more  formal  framework,  we model  the
the minimum price floor.  Except when available  likelihood of a given trade being renegotiated.  Let
supplies  are  extremely  large,  the  seller  also  at-  5i = 1 if a given trade is renegotiated and let 8i = 0
tempts  to  establish  a  price  that  at  least  covers  otherwise.  The probability that a trade is renego-
production  and  harvest  costs,  in  addition  to  tiated  is  taken to be  a function  of the  change  in
packing  costs.  The buyer negotiates  with the  in-  market  prices  between  the  time  of initial  sales
tent  of providing  the  quality  and  quantity  pre-  agreement  and  arrival  at  receiving  point,  the
ferred  by  his  customers  given  the  established  number of defects observed in the sample cherries
price.  However,  because  of the  susceptibility  of  (proxies  for  quality),  and  shipper  and  receiver
cherries  to  packing  and  shipment  damage,  the  dummy variables.
buyer cannot be certain of fruit quality until it ar-  The  change  in market prices  in the time in-
rives  at the receiving point.  Thus,  at the time of  terval  between  initial  sale  and  final  sale
the sale, the buyer has knowledge  of current mar-  (CMRKTi)  is  expected  to  have  an  influence  on
ket conditions  and past history but does not have  the  likelihood  that  a  trade  is  renegotiated.  If
perfect information  on quality,  prices in the marketplace  are  increasing,  then re-
When  the cherries  arrive  at the  destination,  ceivers  are expected to be  less likely to initiate a
the  buyer  has  updated  information  concerning  price adjustment preferring the lower initial price
both  local  and distant  market conditions  but also  quote.  Price adjustments  likely occur under these
now  has  direct  information  on  quality.  When  conditions only if fruit quality at arrival  is signifi-
confronted with direct information  on quality and  cantly  below  initial  expectations.  On  the  other
updated  information  on  market  conditions  the  hand,  if prices  in  the market  are  falling,  the  re-
buyer  may  ask for a price  adjustment  --  seek to  ceiver has an incentive to seek a price adjustment.Schotzko and Wilson  Price  Adjustments in Cherry Markets  49
Due to product attributes,  (e.g.,  perishability) the  tribution;  8i = 1 if the  ithtrade is renegotiated and
receiver  has  a much stronger bargaining position  8i  =  0  otherwise;  Xi  represents  the  explanatory
once the  product  is received.  The  stronger  bar-  variables  associated  with  the  ih  trade  defined
gaining  position then reinforces the likelihood  of  above;  and  is a vector of coefficients  to be esti-
renegotiation  when  prices  are  falling.  Real  or  mated.  N is the number of sales  in the  data set.
perceived  quality problems  during  period  of fal-  The  probit model  given by  (1) was estimated  by
ling prices  are more likely to result  in renegotia-  using OLS to obtain starting values to form initial
tion than during periods of rising prices,  estimates  of the  likelihood.  We  then  maximize
Quality  of the  product,  the  number  of de-  the likelihood using the Newton method.
fects  in a lot, increases the probability of renego-
tiation.  There  are  a wide  variety of quality  de-  Data
fects  (quality variables)  which may influence the
decision  to  renegotiate  a  trade.  These  defects  The  data consist of information  concerning  indi-
have been grouped  into three categories.  DEFOR  vidual  sales  of 178  cherry  lots  between  packing
includes  those factors that likely occur in the  or-  houses  in  Washington  and  wholesalers  in  New
chard.  Theses  include healed  cracks,  russet,  in-  York during the summer  of 1987.  The data were
sect bites, limb rub, and pulled  stems.  DEFAFT,  collected  at  both  shipping  and  receiving  points.
includes  brown  discoloration,  decay, mold,  fresh  Hebert Research Inc. collected the receiving point
cracks, bruising, and pitting.  These defects could  data, while  shippers  provided the  shipping point
occur in the orchard, but they may also occur  af-  data.  The  data  include  information  on  price,
ter  delivery  to  the  warehouse  or  during  transit.  quality  attributes,  market  conditions,  and  firms.
DEFOTH,  consists  of factors  important  to  con-  The  price  variables  include  the  initially  agreed
sumers  even where no other defect exists.  These  F.O.B. price and the actual price received.
include  are stem  color, fruit color,  firmness,  and  The  quality data  were  collected  at receiving
deposits.  point.  From  each lot of cherries a random sample
We  include  shipper  (Si)  and  receiver  (Ri)  of 30 fruit was drawn.  Each cherry was inspected
dummy variables to account for unobserved char-  for defects and the defects were recorded.  All de-
acteristics of shippers and receivers.  Such charac-  fects on each cherry  were  counted.  For each  lot
teristics  may  reflect  different  strategies  in  the  the total  number of each type  of defect was  en-
bargaining process, different handling/sorting/dis-  coded (i.e.; a defect variable ranges from 0 to 30).
tribution techniques,  different  quality characteris-
tics, etc.  We add a time trend to account for other  Empirical Results
variables  which  may  be  correlated  with  time.
Such  variables  include  the  turnover of competi-  We examine a variety of specifications of the
tors  in the marketplace,  and a rotating  of market  renegotiation model  (Equation  1).  The specifica-
activity  from  southern  Washington  to  northern  tions  differ  according  to  treatments  of  trends,
Washington  which  may  account  for  different  shipper-receiver  dummy variables, and the quality
quality distributions.  variables.  Table 1 provides  a summary of results
We  report  the  results  of  several  different  from four different specifications.  Results with a
models.  In  a general  form, the model  is a quali-  trend variable  are not  reported.  A  strong  multi-
tative response model2 collinear  relationship  between  the  trend  variable
and  CMRKT,  and  the  effect  of  CMRKT  was
(1)  Prb(6i = 1 Xi 0) = F(Xi)  I = 1, 2,..., N  negative and  insignificant  in all models estimated
with a trend.
where:  F(  represents  the normal  cumulative  dis-  Model  1 in Table  1 is the basic  model.  This
model  performs  reasonably  well,  correctly  fore-
2 See Amemiya (1985)  for a complete discussion of quality  casting  whether  trades  are  renegotiated  80%  of
response models.  the  time.  The  signs  of  all  variables  except50  September 1995  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
DEFOR  are  as  expected.  Using  a  one-tail  test,  defects  included  in  DEFOR  all  occur  in  the  or-
DEFAFT  is  significant  at  the  10%  level,  chard  and are  visible.  Graders  in the warehouse
DEFOTH  is  significant  at  the  5%  level,  while  have  the responsibility  of removing  these  defec-
DEFOR is of the wrong sign.  tive fruit.  Since grade  standards  specifically  cite
While the DEFOR result  is inconsistent  with  the tolerances,  it is in the shippers best interest to
initial  expectations,  there  is  another,  equally  remove  almost all, if not all, fruit with defects so
plausible,  explanation for the negative signs.  The  that the cartons can be certified as U.S. No. 1's.
Table 1. Probability Estimates of Renegotiationa
Models
........................................................................................................................................................................................
Variable  1  2  3  4
One  0.8948  1.12971**  -1.16988**  -1.21998*
(1.151)  (1.679)  (1.754)  (3.422)
CMRKT  0.177916*  .160860**  0.165911**  0.142129*
(1.660)  (1.559)  (1.626)  (1.845)
TOTALDEF  0.0083418**
(1.45)
DEFOR  -0.007555  -0.028039  -0.0549103
(0.962)  (0.825)  (2.122)
DEFAFT  0.022689**  0.039396*
(1.292)  (2.777)




S4  -1.33878*  -1.3840*  -1.40267*
(2.615)  (2.731)  (2.80)
S5  -7.09828  -7.11747  -7.3594
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019)
S9  -0.78991  -0.752102  -0.809623
(1.375)  (1.403)  (1.531)
R2  0.222214  0.187537  0.036427
(0.317)  (0.271)  (0.053)
R3  -1.85339*  -1.90169*  -1.77767*
(4.198)  (4.365)  (4.328)
R4  -5.77523  -5.82579  -5.87924
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)
R6  -0.601104  -0.667874  -0.676484
(0.910)  (1.023)  (1.041)
R7  -6.08057  -6.07808  -6.02674
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)
R8  0.094362  0.067348  0.233806
(0.176)  (0.127)  (0.459)
R9  -0.309494  -0.29784  -0.245927
(0.710)  (0.686)  (0.572)
RII  -2.44620  -2.46535*  -2.47102*
(3.725)  (3.762)  (3.747)
X2df  95.5791515  95.21714  14  94.031313  11.62344
% Correct  80  80  82  23
% Correct  80  80  81  89
% Correct (All)  80  80  81  65
a t-values are provided in (  ). A * and a ** indicate significance  at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  All inter-
cept and dummy variable tests are two-sided tests while all others are one-sided tests.Schotzko and Wilson  Price  Adjustments in Cherry Markets  51
When fruit delivered to the warehouse  has a  has the  expected sign and is significant  at the 5%
large  number of defects,  the warehouse  has  two  level,  while  DEFOR  is  not  significant.  In  this
options.  The  fruit  can  be  diverted  directly  to  model  CMRKT  remains  significant  at  only  the
processing.  The  other  option  is  to  remove  as  10%  level.  The  signs  and  levels  of significance
much  defective fruit as possible from  the  lot and  for  all  other  variables  remains  unchanged.  In
then  offer  it  for  sale  on the  fresh  market.  The  Model 3, we aggregate all quality variables into  a
probability  of adjustment  is  inversely  related  to  single measure.  TOTALDEF  includes  all defects
the  firm's  ability  to  eliminate  defective  fruit.  whether caused  in the orchard or elsewhere.  The
There  is,  however,  a  defect  level  at  which  the  TOTALDEF  coefficient  is significant at the  10%
shipper  believes  adjustments  will  be  required.  level.  Only  minor changes  occur  in the  signifi-
Under  these  conditions,  the  shipper  asks  for  a  cance  of the other  coefficients and the chi-square
relatively  low price to avoid later problems.  This  value  suggests  slightly  more  statistical  signifi-
reasoning  suggests  a  relationship  between  cance.  The  predictive  ability of the  equation  is
DEFOR and the probability  of adjustment.  How-  slightly better than models 1 and 2.  The negative
ever,  the  lack  of significance  suggests  that,  at  effects  of DEFOR  are  buried  in  the total  defect
least during this particular harvest season, orchard  variable.  In  Model  4,  we  remove  the  ship-
defects were not a serious problem.  per/receiver dummy variables to reinforce  the im-
Since the shipper  and receiver  variables  are  portance  of buyer and  seller in the fresh produce
binary, the coefficients  for each firm  are relative  business.  Using the  chi-square  as  a measure  of
to the rejected firm.  For example,  the coefficient  impact, model  4's chi-square  is  significant  at the
for shipper number 4  (S4) indicates  that the prob-  0.021  level  while  models  1-3  have  chi-squares
13 ability  of price renegotiation  is significantly  less  with significance  levels in the order of 10-  . The
than  the  likelihood  of  price  renegotiation  for  difference between model 4 and models  1, 2 and 3
shipments  by the  deleted  shipper.  The  receiver  are statistically significant and point to the impor-
variables (Ri)  are evaluated in an analogous man-  tance  of including  shipper/receiver  variables  in
ner.  No a priori  expectations  were developed  for  the model.
these relationships.  Nonetheless,  our results sug-  From the results  of all models,  we  find that
gest unobserved  shipper  and receiver  characteris-  there is strong  evidence  to suggest that variables
tics  are  extremely  important  in  explaining  rene-  representing changing market  conditions,  quality,
gotiation.  and  unobserved  shipper/receiver  characteristics
Changing  market conditions  are  reflected  in  are  important in explaining the probability  of re-
the model  by CMRKT.  CMRKT  is  the  differ-  negotiation.  To  evaluate  the  numerical  impor-
ence between  the F.O.B. price  at the time of ini-  tance of each effect we plot probability schedules
tial sale and the F.O.B. price at the time of arrival  for three  shipper/receiver  pairs  against  CMRKT
in New  York (Normal  transit  time  is  4-5  days.)  and TOTALDEF in Figures  1 and  2, respectively.
The CMRKT  coefficient  in model  1 is significant  In both  figures we  use the  results from  Model 3.
at  the  5%  level  and  has  the  expected  sign;  the  In Figure  1, we plot the probability  of renegotia-
greater  the  decline  in  F.O.B.  price  between  the  tion against CMRKT  evaluated at the mean value
time  of  shipment  and  the  time  of  arrival,  the  of TOTALDEF,  while  in  Figure  2,  we  plot  the
greater the probability that a price adjustment oc-  probability  of renegotiation  against TOTALDEF
curs.  evaluated at the mean value of CMRKT.
Models 2, 3, and 4 are variations of Model  1.  The  patterns  in  both  Figure  1  and  2  are
In  Model  2  and  3,  we  aggregate  the  different  similar.  Over the ranges of market price changes
quality  variables.  In  Model  2,  we  aggregate  and  total  defects  the probability  of renegotiation
DEFAFT  and  DEFOTH  into  one  variable,  increases  steadily.  The  probability  is  higher  for
DEFAFT1.  By  aggregating  DEFAFT  and  large price changes  and for lots with a large num-
DEFOTH  we  have  two  quality  measures.  ber of defects than for small price changes and for
DEFOR  relates directly  to  orchard  defects  while  lots with a small number of defects.  But, perhaps
DEFAFTI  contains  all other defects.  DEFAFT1  more  significantly,  are  the  differences  between52  September 1995  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
the probability schedules for different shipper and
Figure  1  receiver  pairs.  Re-negotiated  trades  between  the
shipper  1 and  receiver  1 pair  are very  likely, re-
Renegotiation  and  Market  Price  Changes  gardless of changes  in  market conditions  and  the
quality  of the  cherries.  In  contrast,  trades  be-
Probability  tween shipper 1 and receiver  11  are unlikely to be
renegotiated,  while  trades  between  shipper  2  and
receiver  1 are renegotiated only for large changes
0.8  --  -----  ..---  - - -------------...  in market prices or for lots of cherries with a large
number of defects.
0.6^^^^^/~~  ~Conclusions
0.4  ----  .---- ---------------------  - .. _  _._.  The fresh produce market system is based on one-
..--  ........ to-one  negotiations  and  is  heavily  influenced  by
2_  ___  _......  current  market  conditions,  product  quality,  and
0.2  -
.............-.......-  ......  '-  knowledge  of individual buyer and seller market-
ing strategies.  We test these relationships,  in this
o  —  l  ,  l  study, by using data from the fresh cherry market,
-2  -1  0  1  2  3  a commodity that is highly  susceptible to market
Change  in Market  Price ($/box)  changes,  declining quality, as well as characteris-
tics of the agents involved in the trade. - S-1  R-1  S-2R-  --  - ---  S-R  R-1. Changes in market conditions are changes  in
prices  between  shipping  dates  and  arrival  dates.
We  find that such  changes  do  influence  renego-
tiation  even  though  initial  price  agreements  are
Figure  2  legally  binding  (assuming  that  the  other  condi-
tions of the agreement are met).  Nonetheless, our
Renegotiation  and  Total Defects  results  suggest  that  shippers  often  acquiesce  to
the demands of buyers to renegotiate.
Ir1bblt  ',The  level of defects  also increases the prob-
ability  of renegotiation.  Buyers  tend to  react to
the overall appearance  of the product  in the  car-
ton.  We  examine  the  effects  of quality  defects
that occur in the orchard and are visible at grading
0.6  -__-  __  ..  ... _......._.  time and those defects occurring later and find di-
chotomous  results.  This finding has implications
for the industry.  The lack of a significant positive
°0.4  '  - -··-:-----  --  —--  ----  ---  ................  coefficient for DEFOR is consistent with shippers
------  ..  revealing  accurate  time-of-sale  quality  informa-
0.2  -----  .----  _  .........  _  tion.  Indeed,  the negative  coefficient  of DEFOR
.- —~---'-"----  ~may  even suggest sellers may understate time-of-
shipment  quality  levels.  On the other  hand,  de-
3  3  73  93  13  fects  not observed  at grading time, but manifest-
ing  themselves  later,  do  increase  the  probability
Number Total  Defects of a price  adjustment.  (Bruising and pitting often
- S1 R  - S-2  R1  -.......  S-1  R-11  become  obvious  only  after  the  fruit  have  been
packed  in cartons  and  shipped.)  Identifying  and
minimizing the causes of these defect factors maySchotzko and Wilson  Price  Adjustments in Cherry Markets  53
reduce the probability of adjustment by increasing  References
the quality of the cherries on arrival.
An  interesting  aspect of the  defect  issue  is  Akerlof,  G.  A.,  1970,  "The  Market  for  'Lemons':
implicit in these results,  but discussed  more fully  Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,"
in Harwood-Rom;  that individual  defects  are  not  The Quarterly Journal  ofEconomics, 84, pp. 488-
significant in isolation.  This suggests that receiv-  500.
ers  are  not  concerned  about  individual  defects,  Allen,  F.,  1984,  "Reputation  and  Product  Quality,"
ers  are.  not. .Rand  Journal  of Economics, 15, pp. 311-327. but, rather, how the fruit appears  in the container.  dJ  oic  5, pp. 3  7. Amemiya,  Takeshi.  Advanced  Econometrics.  Cam-
Eye-appeal  is  commonly  understood  to  be  very  bridge, Harvard University Press, 1985.
important  in the sale  of most fruits  and  vegeta-  Bond, E.  W.,  1982,  "A  Direct  Test of the  'Lemons'
bles.  Model:  The  Market  for  Used  Pickup  Trucks,"
Perhaps  the  most  interesting  results  are  the  American Economic Review, 72, pp. 836-840.
shipper  and receiver variables.  Firms within the  Faulhaber, G.  R., and Yao,  D. A.,  1989,  "Fly-by-Night
fresh-produce  industry  operate  within  different  Firms  and  the  Market  for  Product  Review,"
market niches.  Quality of product tends to be the  Journal  ofIndustrial  Economics, 38, pp. 65-77.
differentiating  factor, although  service  is also of-  Gal-Or,  E.,  1989,  "Warranties as  a Signal  of Quality,"
ten used  to  differentiate  one  firm  from  another.  CanadianJournalofEconomics,2,  pp. 51-61.
Harwood-Rom,  Melissa,  "An  Economic  Analysis  of The results of this study  indicate that there are,  in  Har  om  ess,  onomc  A  s  Factors  Influencing  Washington  Sweet  Cherry
fact, significant differences  between  shippers and  F.O.B.  Price  Adjustments,"  Unpublished  M.S.
buyers.  One  explanation  for this  finding  is that  Thesis.  Department  of Agricultural  Economics,
firms stressing quality tend to have  less occasion  Washington  State University, 1989.
to  renegotiate  price,  and  buyers  wanting  quality  O'Rourke,  A. Desmond,  "The  Effect of Ex-Post Price
products  tend  to  reject  low  quality  shipments  Adjustments on Determination  of F.O.B.  Prices."
rather than  renegotiate  price.  Indeed,  over time  Paper  presented  at the  1974  American  Agricul-
these buyers tend to identify shippers who  consis-  tural  Economics  Association  Annual  Meetings,
tently deliver higher-quality product and purchase  College Station, Texas.
product  only from those  firms.  At the  other  ex-  Rosenman, Robert E., and Wesley W. Wilson, "Quality
ro  f  those  frmse A  e  o ther pi-  Differentials and Prices:  Are  Cherries  Lemons." treme  are those  buyers  who use  price  as the  pJournal  ofIndustrial  Economics, Vol. 39 pp 649- Journal  of industrial  Economics, Vol. 39 pp 649-
mary criterion.  These buyers  might be expected  658.
to  seize  every  opportunity  to  achieve  a  lower  Swanson,  Donald  S.  "An  Analysis  of Fresh  Sweet
price.  Cherry  Demand  and  Sales."  Unpublished  M.S.
In  the  final  analysis,  while  price  declines  Thesis.  Department  of Agricultural  Economics,
between  shipment  and  arrival  can  impact  actual  Washington State University,  1985.
price  paid  and while defects  do  influence  buyer  Tucker,  Kelly  A.  "An  Economic  Analysis  of  Sweet
actions  regarding  renegotiation,  the  inclusion  of  Cherry  Size and Yield."  Unpublished M.S. The-
shippers  and receivers  had the biggest impact  on  sis.  Department  of  Agricultural  Economics,
the ability  of the  model to predict  renegotiation.  Washington State University, 1987.
Waugh,  F.V.  Quality as a Determinant of Vegetable Having quality product is  important, but knowing  Prices.  New York,  Colubia University  Press,
or knowing about the buyer  is at  least as impor-  1929.
tant in minimizing the prospects of renegotiation.